UK Diplomats Advised Regarding Military Action to Topple Zimbabwe's Leader
Newly disclosed papers reveal that the Foreign Office advised against British military intervention to remove the then Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, in 2004, stating it was not considered a "serious option".
Government Documents Show Deliberations on Handling a "Depressingly Healthy" Dictator
Policy papers from the then Prime Minister's government indicate officials weighed up options on how best to deal with the "depressingly healthy" 80-year-old dictator, who declined to leave office as the country fell into violence and economic chaos.
Following the ruling party winning a 2005 election, and a year after the UK joined a US-led coalition to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Downing Street asked the Foreign Office in July 2004 to produce potential courses of action.
Isolation Strategy Deemed Not Working
Officials agreed that the UK's strategy to isolate Mugabe and building an international agreement for change was failing, having failed to secure support from key African nations, notably the then South African president, the South African leader.
Options outlined in the documents included:
- "Seek to remove Mugabe by force";
- "Go for tougher UK measures" such as seizing finances and shuttering the UK embassy; or
- "Re-open dialogue", the option advocated by the then outgoing ambassador to Zimbabwe.
"We know from Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia that changing a government and/or its bad policies is almost impossible from the outside."
The FCO paper dismissed military action as not a "realistic option," and warned that "The only nation for leading such a armed intervention is the UK. No one else (even the US) would be prepared to do so".
Warnings of Significant Losses and Jurisdictional Barriers
It cautioned that military intervention would cause heavy casualties and have "serious consequences" for UK nationals in Zimbabwe.
"Barring a major humanitarian and political disaster â resulting in massive violence, significant exodus of refugees, and regional instability â we judge that no African state would agree to any attempts to remove Mugabe by force."
The paper adds: "We also believe that any other international ally (including the US) would authorise or participate in military intervention. And there would be no jurisdictional basis for doing so, without an approving Security Council Resolution, which we would fail to obtain."
Playing the Longer Game Advocated
Blair's foreign policy adviser, a senior official, warned him that Zimbabwe "could become a real spoiler" to his plan to use the UK's presidency of the G8 to make 2005 "the year of Africa". The adviser stated that as military action had been discounted, "it is likely necessary that we must adopt a long-term strategy" and re-open talks with Mugabe.
Blair seemed to concur, noting: "We should work out a way of revealing the falsehoods and misconduct of Mugabe and Zanu-PF ahead of this election and then afterwards, we could try to re-engage on the basis of a firm agreement."
The departing ambassador, in his valedictory telegram, had advocated critical re-engagement with Mugabe, though he understood the Prime Minister "might shudder at the thought given all that Mugabe has said and done".
The Zimbabwean leader was ultimately removed in a 2017 coup, at the age of 93. Earlier assertions that in the early 2000s Blair had tried to pressure Thabo Mbeki into joining a military coalition to overthrow Mugabe were vehemently rejected by the ex-British leader.